

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
EASTERN DIVISION**

**PHILLIP JAMES DISTASIO,**

**Plaintiff,**

**v.**

**GARY C. MOHR, *et al.*,**

**Defendants.**

**Civil Action 2:18-cv-103**

**Chief Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.**

**Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura**

**ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

Plaintiff, Phillip Distasio, a state inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this action against Gary C. Mohr, the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”), alleging that the ODRC’s refusal to provide inmates who are serving a life sentence with physician-assisted suicide is unconstitutional. This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); *see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, the undersigned **RECOMMENDS** that the Court **DISMISS** this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2). (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff's motion is **GRANTED**. Plaintiff is required to pay the full amount of the Court's \$350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff's certified trust fund statement reveals that he had the sum of twelve cents in his prison account as of January 22, 2018. That amount is insufficient to pay the full filing fee.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff's inmate trust account (Inmate Number A-513817) at Toledo Correctional Institution is **DIRECTED** to submit to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six-months immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint. After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the inmate's preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the account exceeds \$10.00 until the full fee of \$350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court.

The checks should be sent to:

Prisoner Accounts Receivable  
260 U.S. Courthouse  
85 Marconi Boulevard  
Columbus, Ohio 43215

The prisoner's name and this case number must be included on each check.

It is **ORDERED** that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs

had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is **DIRECTED** to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison cashier's office. The Clerk is further **DIRECTED** to forward a copy of this Order to the Court's financial office in Columbus.

## I.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal *in forma pauperis* statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” *Id.* at 31 (quoting *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)<sup>1</sup> as part of the statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—

\* \* \*

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); *Denton*, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires *sua sponte* dismissal of an action upon the Court's determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. *See Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

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<sup>1</sup>Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,’” is insufficient. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, a complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” *Id.* (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” *Id.* (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Id.* In considering whether this facial plausibility standard is met, a Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept all factual allegations as true, and make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. *Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield*, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555). In addition, the Court holds *pro se* complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” *Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t*, No. 08-3978,

2010 WL 1252923, at \*2 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (quoting *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)).

## II.

According to the Complaint, Plaintiff is currently serving a life sentence with no opportunity for parole. Plaintiff alleges that he is mentally competent, citing the fact that he was adjudicated mentally competent to stand trial. He further alleges that his requests for “suicide pills” have been denied. (Compl. 5, ECF No. 1-2.) Plaintiff asks for a Court order compelling ODRC to acknowledge the right of an inmate who is serving a life sentence to physician-assisted suicide and also compelling ODRC to change its policies to permit physician-assisted suicide for inmates serving life sentences.

To sustain a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must establish that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that this deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. *Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks*, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); *Ellison v. Garbarino*, 48 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1995).

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim because there is no constitutional right to euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide. *See Washington v. Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. 702, 705, 720-34 (1997) (holding that state law prohibiting causing or aiding a suicide does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution); *Kerry v. Din*, 135 S.Ct. 2128, 2135 (2015) (“*Glucksberg* rejected a claimed liberty interest in ‘self-sovereignty’ and ‘personal autonomy’ that extended to assisted suicide when there was a longstanding tradition of outlawing the practice of suicide.” (quoting *Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 723-24)); *see also Vacco v. Quill*, 521 U.S. 793, 808–09 (1997) (noting that state interests in “prohibiting intentional killing and preserving life; preventing suicide; . . . protecting vulnerable people from indifference, prejudice,

and psychological and financial pressure to end their lives; and avoiding a possible slide towards euthanasia . . . easily satisfy the constitutional requirement . . . .”); *Whipple v. Piper*, No. 17-CV-5137, 2017 WL 6756600, at \*1 (D. Minn. Dec. 7, 2017) (dismissing inmate’s lawsuit challenging the prison’s refusal of his request to be euthanized pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).

Because Plaintiff cannot maintain his due-process claim of a right to physician-assisted suicide, it is **RECOMMENDED** that the Court **DISMISS** Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety pursuant to § 1915(e)(2).

### **III.**

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff White’s motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2) is **GRANTED**. (ECF No. 1.) In addition, it is **RECOMMENDED** that the Court **DISMISS** Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A.

The Clerk of Court is **DIRECTED** to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison cashier’s office. The Clerk is further **DIRECTED** to forward a copy of this Order to the Court’s financial office in Columbus. Finally, the Clerk is **DIRECTED** to send a copy of this order to the Ohio Attorney General’s Office, 150 E. Gay St., 16th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215.

### **PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS**

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a *de novo* determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report and Recommendation *de novo*, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. *See Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *United States v. Walters*, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura  
CHELSEY M. VASCURA  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE